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Abortion Reform

by Richard D. Lamm

and Steven G. Davison

Richard Lamm is Associate Professor
of Law at the University of Denver
Law School, as well as Assistant
Minority Leader of the Colorado
House of Representatives. He was
chief sponsor of Colorado's 1967
Therapeutic Abortion Act and is now
counsel for a group challenging that
statute as unconstitutional.
Steven Davison, a third year law student at Yale Law School, has participated in the litigation challenging the
1967 Colorado Therapeutic Abortion
Act.

Since the authors of this article are
men and since a central contention in
the controversy over abortion is that
the resolution of these issues remains
in the control of men, the Review has
invited four women involved in the
abortion reform movement to participate in a symposium. In the fall issue,
we will present a transcription of their
discussion on this article and on
abortion reform in general.
The Editors

All societies have faced the problem
of unwanted pregnancy. A recipe for
inducing an abortion has been attributed to the Chinese Emperor Shen
Nung, who reigned in the 27th
century B.C. Egyptian papyri containing information both on birth
control and abortion have been found.
Views on abortion, however, have
varied both between cultures and within the same culture. The Hippocratic
oath, which states, "I will not give to a
woman an abortive remedy," did not
reflect contemporary Greek attitudes,
but was derived from the views of
Pythagoreans, a minority within the
Greek culture. Plato suggested abortion as a method for maintaining the
stability of population in his ideal
state, .and Aristotle felt that abortion
"before she felt life" was the solution
when a woman "had the prescribed
number of children."
Other writers saw that abortion
involved something more than an unwanted pregnancy and recognized
certain rights of the fetus, but these
were not rights which overrode a
woman's health. Sonarus (A. D.
98-138), an early Greek expert on
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obstetrics and a biographer of
Hippocrates, wrote that "[t] he fruit
of conception is not to be destroyed
at will because of adultery or of care
of beauty, but it is to be destroyed to
avert danger appending to birth .... "
A 5th century Latin grammarian
analogized abortion to "removing dry
twigs to save a living tree, or jettisoning cargo to save a storm threatened
ship."
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Legislative Regulation of
Abortion
There was no common law crime of
abortion. Blackstone's Commentaries
states that "life begins in contemplation of law as soon as the infant is able
to stir in the mother's womb." The
first statute prohibiting abortion
before quickening was not passed in
England until 1803. Connec ticu t
passed an abortion statute in 1821,
permitting abortion after quickening
only when necessary to preserve the
life of the woman. New York adopted
a statute in 1828 prohibiting all abortions except where necessary to protect the life of the woman. Until
recently, restrictive statutes like these
remained in force in most states.
Early court decisions and other
evidence indicate that the original
policy consideration in adopting antiabortion legislation was concern for
maternal health.· All internal surgery
was highly dangerous at the time, since
Joseph Lister's findings on antiseptic
surgery were not printed until 1867,
over 40 years after the first sta tes
began passing anti-abortion statutes.
Abortions, even in hospitals, were
much more dangerous than bearing a
child, and the law sought to compel a
woman to bear a child rather than to
risk the dangers of abortion.
Today, however, modern medicine
gives us different policy considerations. According to figures of Dr.
Christopher Tietze of the Population
Council, it is six to ten times more
dangerous in the United States to
complete pregnancy than to have a
hospital abortion? Hungary reports
0.6 deaths per 100,000 hospital abor-

tions, and Czechoslovakia had 140,000
abortions in 1964, with no deaths. By
contrast, estimates of the number of
deaths resulting from illegal abortion
range from 1,000 a year upward. The
Los Angeles County General Hospital
reports an average of 10 cases a day,
or 3,500 cases a year, of women suffering from poorly performed illegal
abortions. In New York City almost
half of all deaths associated with childbearing are related to illegal abortion.
There was nothing on the horizon
in the 1960's, when abortion reform
began in the United States, to show
that the availability of legal hospital
abortions was improving or that the
health hazards posed by illegal aborwere diminishing. Lader, in his book
Abortion, states that the number of
hospital abortions declined from
30,000 to 8,000 between 1941 and
1966. These figures are in sharp contrast to the estimated 1,000,000
illegal abortions performed each year
in the United States. Kinsey shows
that one out of five pregnancies in the
United States is terminated by illegal
abQ!tinn
Keform was spurred in the 1960 s
by a shift in general public opinion
toward acceptance of liberalized
abortion statutes? The change was
reflected in 1962 when the Model
Penal Code proposed by the American
Law Institute included a provision
permitting abortion if three physicians
certified that continuation of pregnancy was (A) likely to result in the
death of the woman, the serious impairment of her physical or mental
health, or the birth of a child with
grave and permanent physical deformity or mental retardation; or (B) if the
pregnancy was the result of rape
(including statu tory rape) or incest. In
1967, Colorado became the first state
to adopt a statute patterned generally
after the 1962 Model Penal Code. The
reform in Colorado received national
publicity and generated similar efforts
in a number of other states. California,
Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, New
Mexico, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Oregon and Virginia followed
Colorado and passed similar reform
statutes based upon the Model Penal
Code.
Since 1967, the deb a te with respect
to liberalized abortion has moved from
reform to repeal. In many states,
yesterday's controversies are today's

settled policies. Governor Rockefeller
of New York has announced he would
veto any legislation that seeks to
amend restrictively the 1970 New
York repeal statute. Hawaii, Washington and Alaska have joined New York
in passing laws which permit women
to receive abortions without regard to
indications. Even the usually conservative National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws has
recently appointed a subcommittee on
abortion, and the subcommittee's first
draft is tantamount to a call for repeal.
I n a number of states, however, the
time for liberalized abortion has not
arrived. Iowa has defeated a reform
statute, Maryland has refused to adopt
a repeal statute to replace its 1968
reform statute and the Connecticut
House of Representatives has overwhelmingly defeated a proposal to
liberalize the state's restrictive abortion statute.
The ultimate disposition of these
restrictive statutes may come from litigation establishing the constitutional
right of women to seek abortions without restriction by the state. Attempts
to obtain legislative reform have been
paralleled by litigation challenging the
constitutionality of both restrictive
and reform statutes. There have been
numerous lower court decisions with
respect to the constitutionality of
state abortion statutes, and there are
approximately 70 suits challenging
state abortion statutes awaiting
decision in state and federal courts.

Judicial Reform
People v. Belous 4 is the pioneering
decision in the continuing effort to
overturn restrictive abortion legislation. In an ambiguous decision resting
on several grounds, the court held that
California's 1850 abortion statute,
which prohibited abortion except to
save the woman's life, was unconstitutional because it was so uncertain of
meaning as to violate due process and
because it violated a woman's right to
life and to choose whether to bear
children. The court stated that the
state could not forbid a woman to

procure an abortion where death
from childbirth, although not medically certain, would be substantially
certain or more likely than not.
Since Belous, courts have declared
similar Michigan,S Texas,6 South
Dakota,7 Illinois,s Wisconsin 9 and
Pennsylvania I 0 statutes unconstitutional. Courts have also held that the
California reform statute II and the
Georgia reform statute l2 are unconstitutional.
The constitutional grounds upon
which these courts struck down
statutes include violation of a woman's
right to privacy in matters of family,
sex and marriage; violation of the right
of women to choose whether to bear
children; violation of the right of a
woman to control her own body, and
violation of the right of privacy in the
physician-patient relationship. These
courts have required that the state
show a compelling state purpose J3 to
justify limiting a woman's right to seek
an abortion, and have rejected preserving the life of the fetus, protecting
the life and safety of the woman, and
discouraging pre-marital sexual intercourse as compelling purposes.
Opposing these cases are decisions
by three-judge federal district courts
upholding the restrictive Louisiana 14
and Ohio ls abortion statutes and the
North Carolina reform statu te. 16
These decisions have reflected the
argument that abortion statutes infringe the rights of women and have
held that states can restrict the availability of abortion to protect the life
of the fetus. In so doing, they have
upheld the power of the state to limit
the indications for which women may
seek abortions.
Suits challenging the constitutionality of abortion statu tes basically involve a conflict between the "right" of
a woman to seek an abortion withou t
restrictions imposed by the state and
the "right" of the fetus to be born.
The Supreme Court will eventually
have to decide whether a woman has a
constitutional right to seek an abortion
without state restrictions. If the Court
holds that a woman has such a right,
it still will have to decide whether
there are compelling state purposes
which justify limiting abortions to
certain indications. Preserving of the
life of the fetus probably will receive
the most serious consideration as a
compelling state interest.

This article will consider whether a
woman has a constitu tional right to
seek an abortion without state interference, and whether, if such a right
exists, there is a compelling state
purpose justifying restrictions upon its
exercise. I t also will examine issues
concerning restrictions on who can
perform abortions and where abortions can be performed; requirements
that a woman consult with others
before being permitted to seek an
abortion; requirement of the consent
of the woman's husband or guardians
to her abortion; and provision of
abortions for the poor.

The Right of Married Women to
Seek Abortion
In recognizing a right to privacy in
matters of marital sex and family
planning, the landmark case Griswold
v. Connecticut l7 laid a firm basis for
establishing the constitutional right of
married women to seek abortions.
Griswold overturned the conviction of
a physician and the Executive Director
of the Planned Parenthood League for
aiding and counseling in the use of
contraceptive devices. There were
several opinions acknowledging this
right to privacy, but there was some
disagreement as to the source of the
right.
_
In the opinion of the Court, Justice
Douglas indicated that it was a
penumbral constitutional right emanating from five amendments of the
United States Constitution. He held
that the statute had a "maximum
destructive impact" upon the marital
sexual relationship. But the only such
impace that he specifically mentioned
was the possibility that enforcement
of the statute might include searches
"of marital bedrooms for telltale signs
of the use of contraceptives."
Justice Goldberg, on the other
hand, found this right to exist under
the Ninth Amendment. According to
him, the statute infringed the right of
married persons to control the size of
their family by "voluntary birth
control" and could not be upheld on
the grounds that it discouraged extra-

marital relationships, since the state
could exercise its power to prohibit
extra-marital sexual relationships,
without infringing marital rights of
privacy. In separate opinions, Justices
White and Harlan each saw this right
to privacy as part of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Some approximation of the scope
of the Griswold right can be reached
by putting the opinions together and
deciding what it does not include. For
example, if the only infringement of
the right was that enforcement of the
statute might involve searches of the
marital bedroom, the Court could have
stated that the statute could not be
enforced by such searches. It would
have affirmed, however, since the
conviction in Griswold did not result
from such a search.
If the right was solely to choose
whether to bear children, the Court
also could have affirmed, holding that
a married couple had the right to
engage in sexual intercourse when they
desired to conceive a child but that no
such right existed when they did not
wan t a child.
Finally, if the Court had believed
that a married couple was constitutionally protected in choosing to control the size of their family but not in
choosing the method of doing so, it
could have affirmed, stating that a
married couple could practice abstinence, coitus interruptus or the
rhythm method, but that the state
could prevent the use of contraceptives.
Consequen tly, Griswold incl udes
the right of a married couple to select
the means to regulate the size of their
family and to have intercourse to express their love and to achieve emotional and psychological gratification.
For purposes of invoking Griswold,
there seems to be little difference
between abortion and contraception
as methods of birth control. Both are
voluntary methods to preven t an unwanted birth. Contraception usually
prevents an egg from being fertilized,
while abortion destroys the fertilized
egg. But the intrauterine device (IUD)
and the so-called "morning after" pill
are considered abortifacients because
they seem to destroy the fertilized egg
by preventing its implantation in the
wall of the uterus. IS If there are
reasons why these bio-medical differences should have legal significance,
however, they should be considered
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against a standard which protects the
right to select birth control methods.
Restrictive abortion statutes infringe the right of choice to the extent
of driving a woman to use methods
which may be harmful to her or which
involve a substantial risk of unwanted
pregnancy. The pill has numerous unpleasant side effects, including depression,19 excessive fluid retention jon ,
and possibly the tendency to cause
blood clotting. Moreover, no contraceptive is 100% effective: the pill is
approximately 99% effective, the IUD
approximately 97%, the diaphragm
approximately 95% and the condom
approximately 85%. A failure rate in
contraceptives as low as 1% would
produce over 250,000 unwanted
pregnancies each year in the United·
States. 20 Thus, contraception as a
method of birth control is only a first
line of defense. Abortion is a necessary
method of voluntary birth control
where contraception has failed or was
not used.
Using Griswold to establish the
right to abortion may raise problems
involving the husband's consent, for
Griswold is premised on a right to
marital privacy which includes both
husband and wife. But a doctrine of
consent would permit the state to
intervene on a spouse's side in a private
dispute about one of marriage's most
intimate and important questions.
Nothing in Griswold suggests that
marital disagreements in such matters
are less private than agreements.

The Right of Unmarried Women
to Seek Abortion
As mentioned above, the Griswold
right is limited to married couples. The
cases21 relied upon by Justices Douglas
and Goldberg were concerned primarily with the rights of marriage and
raising children as part of a marital
relationship, and the implication is
that only sexual relationships between
husband and wife are of such a fundamental character as to be protected by
the Constitution. Justice Goldberg's
opinion adds dictum that the state has
the power to prohibit adultery, hO,mosecuality and extramarital sexual
relationships.

Establishing a right to abortion that
encompasses both married and unmarried women can proceed along one
of two lines. The first involves recognizing the unspoken Ninth Amendment right to seek one's own physical
and emotional welfare. The second
picks up the Baird v. Eisenstadt 22
clue that regulating sexual conduct by
forcing women to bear unwanted
children constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.
The Ninth Amendment, in which
three Justices found the Griswold right
to marital privacy, guarantees that the
enumeration of certain constitutional
rights "shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the
people." It protects those rights "so
basic and important that it would be
inconceivable that they are not protected from unwarranted interference"
or "that would be ... natural [sl ubject
of constitutional protection.,,2
The right to care for one's physical
and mental health has been recognized
as a right included within Ninth
Amendment protection. 24 When the
state does intrude in health matters as with drug laws; vaccination requirements; proscriptions against selfmutilation and the sale of liquor to
minors; phYSician licensing requirements and even involuntary blood
transfusions-it does so with an eye to
the well-being of its citizens. Yet
factual information tells us that restrictive abortion laws have the effect
of creating health hazards.
Today, abortion is safer for a
woman than carrying pregnancy to
term and bearing a child; a restrictive
abortion statute may force a woman
to take on an unwanted health risk.
While most such statutes allow abortions when the mother's life or health
is in danger, they require a medical
certain ty greater than that reflected in
common statistics-otherwise, of
course, the statutes would be interpreted as allowing an abortion to any
woman who wanted one. Moreover,
when abortions are unavailable or
severely restricted, a woman is pressured to use contraceptives which may
pose a health risk to her. Finally, it is
indisputable that a sizable number of
women are driven each year to illegal
abortion with all its attendant health
hazards, despite the supposed deterrent effect of restrictive abortion

statutes. Thus, no public health
rationale supports nonrecognition of a
woman's right to protect her physical
and mental health by seeking abortion.
Restrictive statutes also interfere
with the closely related right to receive
the full benefit of treatment from
one's physician. 25 Because many
statutes narrowly limit the indications
for abortion, a physician is not always
able to prescribe an abortion when he
feels it is beneficial. Often, he must
watch helplessly while his patient risks
her health and life at the hands of an
unqualified abortionist.
These restrictions on the doctorpatient relationship are of the same
class as those involved in United States
v. Freund,26 where the court invalidated a Prohibition era statu te which
restricted the amount of alcohol
which a phYSician could prescribe.
The court went on to state,
"It is an extravagant and unreasonable
attempt to subordinate the judgment
of the attending physician to that of
Congress, in respect to matters with
which the former alone is competent
to deal, and infringes upon the duty of
the physician to prescribe in accord
with his honest judgment, and upon
the right of the patient to receive the
benefit of the judgment, and upon the
right of the patient to receive the
benefit of the judgment of the physician of his choice."

In United States v. One Package, 27
Judge Augustus N. Hand considered a
provision of the Comstock Act prohibiting the mailing of any item for
"the prevention of conception or for
. causing abortion." He held that the
provision could not be applied to a
licensed physician acting within the
accepted medical practices of the day
and pointed out that it would be unreasonable to prevent the suppression
of articles, "the use of which in many
cases is advocated by such a weight of
authority in the medical world.,,28 The
same reasoning would limit the application of restrictive abortion statutes
to unlicensed abortionists or would
invalidate a statute clearly intended to
apply to doctors.
A second approach toward securing
protected access to abortions proceeds
by way of the cruel and unusual
punishment clause of the Eighth
Amendment. It focuses upon the

penalties of unwanted pregnancy and
birth that restrictive statutes impose
upon women when contraception fails
or has not been used. In striking down
an anti-contraceptive statute, Baird v.
Eisenstadt 29 seems to have relied on
these grounds; applying the court's
reasoning to restrictive abortion
statutes suggests they are likewise
invalid.
Baird overturned the.. conviction of
a birth control advocate for violating a
Massachusetts law which prohibited
exhibiting, seIling, giving or lending
birth control devices to unmarried
persons. The statute had been
amended by the Massachusetts legislature in an attempt to comply as narrowly as possible with Griswold. The
court held it to be in conflict with
fundamental human rights- though it
did not specify which ones-and outside the powers of the state. Although
it found that the legislature could
prohibit and punish premarital sex,
the Baird court ruled that it could not
do so by making a "personally and
socially undesired pregnancy" and "a
possible obligation of support" the
penalties. Though not stated, the
underlying constitutional theory seems
to be that such penalties would be
cruel and unusual within the meaning
of the Eighth Amendment.
A woman who is denied an abortion is faced with an unwanted pregnancy and the threat of bearing an unwanted child, or in the alternative, a
choice between an illegal abortion
with its attendant hazards and a legal
abortion in another jurisdiction with
all its expenses and inconveniences. A
woman in such a situation has "a fate
of ever-increasing fear and distress.,,3o
This argument is not met by saying,
as did the court in Steinberg v.
Brown. 31 that an unwanted pregnancy
is not cruel if it can be avoided by
abstinence and is not unusual if the
country is full of them; this ignores
the fact that an unwanted pregnancy
is cruel and unusual as a punishment.
Baird recognized that unwanted pregnancies and children are no longer
acceptable penalties for conduct considered deviant by the legislature. This
judgment incorporates an established
notion.
"The basic concept underlying the
Eighth Amendment is nothing less
than the dignity of man .... [T] he

words of the Amendment are not
precise, and their scope is not static.
The Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.,,32

Status of The Fetus
Once the constitutional right to
abortions has been established, it can
be infringed only if the state can show
a compelling interest or purpose. Protecting the health and safety of the
woman is not a compelling state
purpose because an abortion is safer
than continuance of pregnancy and
birth. Preventing pre-marital intercourse and furthering public morality
have already been rejected as compelling interests. Fetal rights remain as
the most likely possibility to receive
serious consideration.
Proponents of abortion reform
argue that statutes should continue to
respect the creative process inherent in
fetal life but not at the expense of
forcing motherhood upon dissenting
women. They are concerned with the
effect an unwanted pregnancy has on
the quality of the mother's and the
child's lives. On the whole, they tend
to stress the quality of life after birth
rather than the mere existence of life,
while their opponents argue for the
"transcendence of any life, born or unborn, over the health or happiness of
an older or more power f uII I'fe. ,,33
Courts which have upheld restrictive abortion statutes while overturning laws prohibiting the use of contraceptives have generally relied on the
fact that abortion always involves
destroying the fetus while contraception usually does not. Thus, the
majority in Rosen v. Louisiana State

Board of Medical Examiners 34
justified different treatment on the
ground that
" ... the basic distinction be tween a
decision whether to bear children and
one which is made after conception is
that the first contemplates the creation
of a new human organism, but the
latter contemplates the destruction of

. aIrea dy crea t ed .,,35
such an orgamsm
The court characterized the basic
question as whether the state could,
under the Fourteenth Amendment,
"assign to the human organism in its
early prenatal development as embryo
and fetus a right to be born unless the
condition of pregnancy directly and
proximately threatens the mother's
life." It held that the legislature could
and found the Louisiana statute
reasonably directed toward that aim.
TheRosen court refused to recognize any constitutional right to abortion and consequently did not decide
whether protecting the fetus was a
compelling state purpose that would
justify overriding that right. Similar
reasoning was used with the same
results in Corkey v. Edwards 36 and
Steinberg v. Brown,37 although the
Corkey court contradicted itself in
simultaneously acknowledging that
fundamental issues of privacy were at
stake and refusing to apply the compelling state purpose test. All three
decisions can be criticized on the
ground that by not recognizing the
woman's right to abortion, they mischaracterize the question of the state's
power to regulate and thus skew the
balance between maternal and fetal
rights.
In any case, the law's decision as to
where life begins is somewhat arbitrary
from both a religious and a scientific
point of view. Some proponents of
liberalized abortion argue that the
exact nature of the fetus is a matter of
spiritual supposition and that "life" is
a continuum-there being life in the
sperm and the ova even before fertilization. According to them, calling the
fetus an "unborn child" begs the question, for one might as easily call each
sperm an "unconceived child."
Others dispute the significance of
fertilization as a scientific matter.
"When a fetus is destroyed, has
something valuable been destroye'd?
The fetus has the potentiality of becoming a human being. A human being
is valuable. Therefore is not the fetus
of equal value? This question must be
answered.
"It can be answered, but not
briefly. What does the embryo receive
from its parents that might be of
value? There are only three possibilities: substance, energy and information. As for the substance, it is not
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remarkable: merely the sort of thing
one might find in any piece of meat,
human or animal, and there is very
little of it-only one and half micrograms, which is about a half of a
billionth of an ounce. The energy content of this tiny amount of material is
likewise negligible. As the zygote
developes into an embryo, both its
substance and energy content increase
(at the expense of the mother); but
this is not a very important mattereven an adult from this standpoint is
only a hundred and fifty pounds of
meat.
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"Clearly, the humanly significant
thing that is contributed to the zygote
by the parents is the information that
'tells' the fertilized egg how to develop into a human called 'DNA.'
...The DNA constitutes the information needed to produce a valuable
human being. The question is: is this
information precious? I have argued
elsewhere that it is not. ...
"People who worry about the
moral danger of abortion do so because they think of the fetus as a
human being, hence equate feticide
with murder. Whether the fetus is or
is not a human being is a matter of
definition, not fact, and we can define
it any way we wish.,,38
There is no consensus or majority
viewpoint among public health professionals as to when human life
begins. 39 But evenifthere were agreement in scientific circles as to where
the line should be ~rawn, courts' •
inquiry would not be at an end.
. A-s l\ldge ~assibry pointed out
III his dissent In Rosen, the "meaning
of the term 'human life' is a relative
one which depends on the purpose for
which the term is being defined."40
Consequently, he continued, even if
science recognized that the union of
sperm and egg results in a "human
being," that would not necessarily
settle the right of a woman to seek an
abortion. The courts must make their
own assessment of the status of the
fetus for purposes of balancing its
rights against that of the expectant
mother. And a survey of the relevant
case law shows that so far, it has not
been accorded any legal rights as fetus.
Many pregnancies are interrupted
naturally (spontaneously aborted, miscarried or stillborn);41 stillborn fetuses

are viewed as dead human tissue and
disposed of without legal interference.
A fetus that has died in the early
months of pregnancy is considered by
no state or nation to be a dead person.
A charge of homicide will lie against a
person who performs an abortion only
where it is proved that the fetus was
alive outside the mother's womb after
abortion;42 no state imposes penalties
for illegal abortion greater than those
exacted for most misdemeanors. In
addition, the majority of cases deny
damages against a physician for performance of an illegal abortion where
the patient consented. 43 Finally, there
is no case law whatsoever to show that
zygotes, blastulas or embroyos are
"persons" under the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 44
Under English common law, abortion of an unquickened fetus was not
a crime ,45 and this view was absorbed
into American common law by the
vast majority of the courts which considered the question. Moreover, the
English common law considered abortion to be murder only if the fetus was
quickened, born alive, lived for a brief
period and then died. 46 Execution of
a pregnant woman was delayed for her
to give birth to a child only if the fetus
had quickened. 47
Opponents of reform and repeal
legislation rely upon other areas of the
law where they claim the fetus has
been accorded rights. 48 Steinberg v.
Brown 49 argues that since the law
accords property rights to the fetus at
conception, the state should protect
the life of the fetus from that moment.
The fetus, however, must be born alive
to take property; it has no fetal rights
to property. 50 Similarly, if a fetus is
not born alive it cannot transmit an
inheritance by intestacy to others. 5I
Civil cases involving claims for prenatal injuries are also irrelevant for
determining the status and rights of
the fetus with regard·to abortion. A
child must be born alive in order to
recover damages for prenatal injuries;
the right of recovery is a right that
attaches to the living child, not to the
embryo or fetus. 52 The policy underlying this rule is that a child who is
born and lives should be compensated
for post-natal loss caused by a prenatal act. This policy says nothing
about the rights of the fetus qua
fetus. 53 Where damages are awarded
for the death of a fetus as a result of

pre-natal injury, the recovery is for the
"distressing wrong in the loss of a
child,,54 and not for any injuries
suffered by the fetus.
In short, examining cases cited by
opponents of abortion reform shows
that the rights claimed on behalf of
the fetus are actually rights which can
only be exercised by the child after
birth, or rights of the potential
mother or father. The law's appropriate recognition that pre-birth events
may affect the legal status and rights
of a child when born alive does not
establish a state interest in the fetus as
such. Neither does it demonstrate a
state interest in forcing the mother to
gestate the fetus and produce a live
child. 55
Moreover, attempts to protect the
fetus through restrictive abortion
statutes have largely failed. While' they
may prevent the vacillating woman
from seeking an abortion, countless
women still seek illegal abortions,
often under the most frightening conditions, to avoid giving birth to an unwanted child. In balancing fetal and
maternal interests, then, it should be
kept in mind that the status of the
fetus as "life" is largely a rna tter of
religiOUS and scientific speculation,
that public policy has never led the
courts to accord the fetus rights as a
fetus and that attempts to protect the
fetus through restrictive abortion
statutes have led a remarkable lack of
success, only driving women to the
hazards of illegal abortion.

Who, Where and When

According to Doe v. Bolton,56 the
state can limit abortions only to the
extent that health and safety require
it. This involves regulating who can
perform abortions and where, and
ensuring the quality of the woman's
decision to seek an abortion. Courts
should continue to uphold this power,
and legislatures should exercise it.
As to the first two areas, the conservative and easy approach is to allow
only physicians to perform them and
only in fully equipped hospitals. But
such an approach has several draw-

backs. First, it drives the cost of abortions up and thus discriminates against
the poor. The cost of an abortion in a
clinic can be as low as $80, while the
average cost of abortions is $300 to
$575 in private New York hospitals
and $160 to $270 in New York
municipal hospitals. 57 Statistics indicate that there is now a wide disparity
between availability of abortions for
poor and wealthy women. 58 Reform
st~tut~s s~o~ld .be aimed at eliminating
this dlscnmInatIon as much as possible.
Second, allowing only doctors to
perform abortions and only in hospitals may place an excessive demand on
already overburdened facilities. Already, many states are including
residency requirements in their reform
statutes in order to avoid becoming
"abortion meccas" and further
straining their hospitals. Such requirements have been held unconstitutional
as infringing the right to travel. 59 The
problem they seek to address can be
eliminated by easing the limitations on
who can perform abortions and where.
More imaginative legislation would
allow abortions to be performed by
state-certified and trained paraprofessionals under the supervision of
a physician competent to handle
emergencies. It would also permit
abortions to be performed in doctor's
offices or medical clinics which have
emergency facUities for providing
transfusions and anaesthesia or are in
close proximity to hospitals with such
facilities. Limiting the performance of
abortions to hospitals accredited by
the Joint Commission of Accreditation
of Hospitals, as is done under several
reform and repeal statutes, is grossly
inefficient because many of the
requirements for accreditation (e.g.,
dietary and radiology facilities and
facilities for emergency care for mass
casualties) are useless in ensuring safe
abortions.
State legislatures should be concerned with making funds available to
the poor to pay for abortions-either
under Medicaid 60 or other programssince even an $80 clinic abortion may
be too expensive for many women.
Requiring health and hospital insurance policies to pay thl) cost of abortions may also go part way in solving
the problem. State legislatures should
also pressure or require state and local
hospitals to perform abortions and to

perforr~

them humanely . Some hospitals deliberately attempt to discourage
abortions by placing women seeking
them in the obstetrics ward while
awaiting the operation, and following
the operation, where they wake up
surrounded by mothers and new
babies. For a while, Bellevue Hospital
in New York City conducted fetal
heartbeat monitoring while women
were undergoing abortion-placing
electrocardiograms next to them so
that they saw and heard the fetus
die. 61 Congress should consider requiring hospitals receiving Federal
funds under the Hill-Burton Act 62
hospital construction program to perform abortions and to perform them
humanely.
As to the third area of state regulation-ensuring the quality of the
woman's decision-Doe v. Bolton held
that because the fetus has a "potential
of independent human existence" a
woman should give serious and c~reful
consideration to all relevant factors in
reaching her decision to have an abortion. These factors include emotional
economic, psychological, familial and'
medical considerations, and the state
may require her to consult with
licensed ministers, secular guidance

counselors or licensed physicians other
than the physiCian who will perform
the abortion. If a woman is required to
hear the views of both proponents and
opponents of abortion, the interests of
the fetus will be preserved sufficiently
and the applicant will retain her freedom of choice. The function of the
consultants is to expose the woman to
both sides of the issue-not to veto her
decision. Thus, the use of such requirements to restrict the indications
for which abortion is made available
would be unconstitutiona1. 63
The work of the courts and the
legislative process is being accelerated
by the growing feeling that America
and the world are undergoing drastic
changes in their attitudes toward reproduction. The policy reasons for
making an unwilling woman bear an
unwan1ed child are gone, and have
been replaced with a widespread
felling that unwanted children are
community burdens. People are increasingly demanding control over
their own reproductive activities and
are either going to change the laws in
the legislature, or attack them through
the courts, or ignore the laws as do the
thousands of women who each year
get illegal abortions.
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